Volume 18
Issue 4 Fall 1978
Fall 1978

International Oil
M. A. Adelman

Recommended Citation
M. A. Adelman, International Oil, 18 Nat. Resources J. 725 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol18/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

INTERNATIONAL OIL
M. A. ADELMAN*

If all deposits of oil in the earth's crust were known, the cheaper
ones would be exploited first, and within each deposit cost would be
higher the more intensively the oil was exploited. Thus at the intensive and the extensive margin the cost would rise over time. When
marginal cost (which exceeded average cost, thus affording a royalty)
equaled the cost of the cheapest available alternative, there would be
no new investment in oil, and mankind would gradually switch over
to the alternative energy source as existing deposits were run down.
Since prices in this ideal scenario are expected to rise over time,
the royalty on a given deposit would also rise. Hence, the owner of a
low cost deposit, whether a public or private holder, would have a
problem of timing: should he hold off for the higher price later, or
take the lower price sooner? Depending on what he thought was the
appropriate interest rate, which may include a large element of risk,
he would try to arrange depletion so that the present value of exploiting the oil deposit at any given moment was equal to the present
value of doing so at any other moment. Thus a market process levies
a tax on premature use of low cost minerals, including oil.
The ideal process just described is logically sound, but does not
quite match what happens in the real world: mineral prices have not
generally risen (in relation to the general price level). However, few
today will heed the warning of Richard L. Gordon that firms in the
mineral industries have acted as though their reserves were inexhaustible and even renewable, and they have usually been proven right.
For purposes of this paper, we too will disregard this possibility in
the particular case of oil. Some time ago I did a small experiment by
assuming that the nearest alternative energy source to conventional
oil would cost $16 per barrel in 1975 prices, about $18 in 1977
prices, and could be installed to produce very large amounts after the
year 2000 A.D. Mr. Ait Laoussine of Algeria recently estimated the
cost of alternative energy sources in the range of $15.30 to $18.80
per barrel in 1977 dollars.1 I assumed that costs increased relatively
*Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This paper is part of
a research project of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, NSF SIA 75-00739.
1. N. Ait Laoussine, Marketing of Oil and Gas: Sonatrach Case 9 (at OPEC seminar on
rhe Present and Future Role of the National Oil Companies, Vienna, October 10-1 2, 1977).
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little as one went from better to poorer deposits so that the royalty
increased almost as much as the price. In addition, some rather conservative assumptions about demand, risky interest rates, and above
all, assuming that ultimate oil reserves were indeed as estimated in
1975 and that gas reserves were to be ignored, the competitive price
of oil in 1977, making full allowance for its nonrenewable character,
was about $2.25 per barrel in 1977 prices. Since the price was
around $12.70 per barrel it is clear that we cannot possibly explain
the current and prospective international oil price levels by scarcity,
present or foreseen. 2
A different industry supplies a cautionary tale. Airline capital and
operating costs have increased in recent years, yet domestic and international fares were substantially reduced because of the loss of
official support for fixing rates far above competitive levels. Cost
changes were less important than the strength of the monopoly.
Since the oil price is also far above cost (including the present value
of assumed future scarcitV) only a continuing monopoly can sustain
it.
Assuming that the optimal monopoly price is higher than the current price (a consensus view, which I personally share but some
respected observers do not) we will try to indicate why the monopoly will move slowly and gradually. To a first approximation, we
can think of the oil nations as a single seller. If they were selling tin
or coffee for example, and knew the optimal price, they would
charge it forthwith. But oil is so large a part of the world flow of
payments that it would be reckless to disregard the effects of large
sudden changes in that flow. The actions of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as distinguished from their
rhetoric, have always been sober and cautious. The big price increases
of 1973 and of 1974 (over 50 percent from January 1 to midOctober) have played a significant part in the world recession and
stagnation of later years. The direct results of the price increases
were not nearly as important as the secondary effects arising from
the consuming nations' attempts to restrain inflation and prevent
excessive balance of payments deficits. The oil sellers are much better off with higher prices and world stagnation. However, yet highei
prices and worse recession would not be good for them. One should
not expect higher prices until world monetary and trading systems
are in better shape than they are at the time of this writing, January
1978.
2. ADELMAN, The World Oil Cartel: Scarcity, Politics, and Economics, 16 Quarterly
Review of Economics & Business (Summer 1976).
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There is a more particular reason for caution in price raising. The
consuming nations, far from offering any resistance to the higher oil
prices, have talked only of "cooperation, not confrontation," and
have suited the action to the word. The official truth in the United
States is that OPEC actions are good for us. One alleged benefit,
incidentally, is a stronger dollar.' The consuming nations ought not
to be goaded into seeing things as they are, and seeing OPEC as a
burden to be lessened. The consuming nations could, if they wished,
tax away the great bulk of OPEC revenues into their own pockets if
price were in the neighborhood of the "natural limit," the same
prices as an alternative energy source. The nations could also keep
the price from increasing, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, by
levying a progressive tariff or excise tax whose rate increases with the
price. 4 A sensible monopoly ought to sacrifice considerable revenues,
and stay well below the "natural limit" to lessen the risk of such a
catastrophe for them. Consuming governments might never deliberately choose this policy, but if they struggled year after year with
balance of payments difficulties and revenue needs, they might
slowly increase taxes on oil products. Since they are closest to the
final consumer, they have the power to preempt much or most of the
stream of payments from ever getting to the producing governments.
There is a particular version of this weapon which an individual
government could use. I have suggested an auction of American
import entitlements, which would not lower consumer prices but
would divert much or most monopoly revenues to the U.S. Treasury.' This would enable any OPEC nation to cheat, and make
additional sales, or prevent loss of sales, thereby increasing its revenue, by rebating to our government for the right to export to this
country. A number of OPEC governments now sell from one third to
over half of their oil to the United States, and such a system would
require an immediate decision between sticking with OPEC principles, boycotting the auction, and dumping oil on the world market;
or bidding competitively and secretly for sales enough to keep the
industry going at capacity.
The proposal for auctioning oil import rights was approved by the
Economic Task Force of the then President-elect Carter.6 Sub3. Huge OPEC Oil Price Rise Benefited U.S., Washington Post, July 10, 1977 (an excellent paraphrase of the official view, which has ruled since at least mid-I 970, when the State
Department supported Libyan demands).
4. For a formal proof, see my Constraintson the World Monopoly Price (forthcoming in
vol. 1 Resources and Energy, (1978).
5. See Adelman, Oil Import Quota Auctions, 17-22 January/February, 1976.
6. Oil & Gas J., January 10, 1977.
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sequently his energy chief agreed that the plan would work if the
United States dared to let it work. 7 But the Carter Administration is,
in its own language, "grovelling for Arab oil," 8 for reasons not explained. One cannot see much with his forehead to the ground.
At any rate, the oil selling nations ought not to change the fixed
belief by the consuming nations that producing nations will, for
some never stated and hence irrefutable reason, hold the world oil
price below the market-clearing level. (If they did so, the shortage of
oil products would make product prices soar, with huge windfall
gains to refiners and marketers. These gains would be appropriated
by higher crude prices.) Therefore, there will always be a "gap," with
more oil demanded than is offered. Oil will then be distributed by
favor and influence. Hence arises the irresistible ego trip for the
statesmen in declaring that they have succeeded in getting the producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, to produce "enough to meet our
needs." Of course, no matter what price is set, the amount demanded
at that price will equal the amount supplied. Conversely, no matter
what the Saudis produce, the price will rise high enough to where
anybody paying it can have all he wants. So the Saudis will produce
"enough to meet our needs" no matter how much they produce and
sell, at whatever price. The longer we believe in the nonsensical gap,
the better for the cartel. Anything but a slow upward price adjustment might shock us into clarity.
We now relax the assumption that there is a single monopolist, and
recognize that the oil exporting nations are really a group of sellers
of unequal size, of whom Saudi Arabia is by far the biggest in terms
of current and potential oil capacity. It is often asserted that the
Saudis are in effect monopolists of any residual supply, letting everyone else currently produce at full tilt. So far, this theory does violence to the facts. The Saudis increased output by 23 percent between 1973 and 1977, while OPEC output was static. One could
argue persuasively that their ability to be the residual supplier or
restrictor of last resort strengthens the cartel. But if they did become
the residual suppliers, their interests would diverge radically from
those of the rest of the cartel. Others would benefit from a present
price increase, and they would bear the cost. Higher prices would, in
the long run, lessen the market and penalize those with the largest
reserves and longest perspective. Assume that long run elasticity of
demand for OPEC oil is around an improbably low -0.3. Allow Saudi
Arabia to initially produce nearly a third of OPEC output and absorb
7. Washington Post, July 10, 1977.
8. Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1977.
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the total impact of the increased price and lower consumption. Then
a price increase would pay the cartel handsomely but Saudi Arabia
miserably and perhaps not at all. If prices doubled, revenues for
OPEC as a whole would be 62 percent higher, but for Saudi Arabia
they would be only 8 percent higher.
Stagnant revenues are unacceptable to a residual supplier in a market as uncertain as the world oil market. Net demand is not predictable with any accuracy. Even mild percentage changes in the world
demand for oil become magnified into large changes in the demand
for OPEC oil, and still larger changes in the demand for the residual
suppliers' oil. Assume that consumption expected in the nonCommunist world in the early 1980's was about 60 million barrels
daily, but turned out really lower by 5 percent, or 3 million barrels
less daily. Nobody would be surprised. But if all the reduction were
borne by Saudi Arabia, then the unexpected cut coming atop an
expected cut would be intolerable.
Thus the overall notion of the producing nations as either a conventional cartel with a market sharing mechanism, or as a dominant
firm monopoly or a residual-supplier monopoly, are both too simple.
In truth both concepts are included. We can now understand why
price fixing without allocation of markets has made for haphazard
fluctuations in market shares of the OPEC governments. The overpublicized squabble in early 1977 over the "two tier" system only
hides the real problem. The relative value of various crude oils keeps
changing incessently because markets change. Hence, without a system of prompt corresponding adjustments in oil prices, buyers move
from one supplier government to another in search of a better deal.
There was a time when the margins of the operating companies were
so wide that they could accept reductions in net realizations from
one or another country, without switching from one supplier to
another. But their margins are now so low that while it would be an
exaggeration to call them mere buyers, like independent refiners,
their incentives to change from one supplier to the other are many
times as great as they used to be. In the current over-supply of light
crudes, North Sea production is maximized at the expense of everyone else.
Thus we have three problems which must be solved simultaneously
or not at all: crude oil price differentials, company producing margins, and governments' market shares. There is no solution in sight,
and the cartel has gone from one ad hoc arrangement to another. The
OPEC members must from time to time somehow reach an accommodation to allow all of them to share to some extent in the benefit
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of a higher price. The Saudis will veto the higher price unless there is
something in it for them.
With all of these complex problems we really have no need for the
phantoms of "gaps" and "crunches." Nor shall we be distracted by
the alleged political objectives of the oil producing nations, which are
served perfectly by economic gain. There is no sacrifice or trade off
of one or the other. The more money one has, the better position
one is in to make friends and put down enemies.
The last useless distraction involved is the notion that the Saudis
keep oil in the ground for conservation or for its future value. Given
their reserve position, if they produced 10 million barrels daily, a
barrel produced today would sacrifice a barrel in fifty or more years.
The future value of that barrel must be liberally discounted because
of risks: technical, economic, political, and military. At a discount
rate as recklessly low as 5 percent real, $12 from a barrel of oil sold
today is better than $120 from a sale in 2025 A.D. The Saudis
restrain output today to maintain the price today-a good reason,
and the only one which makes sense.
CONCLUSION
We can probably look forward to a decade of rising real oil prices,
slowed economic growth, chronic surpluses and increasingly strident
eventual-shortage rhetoric. By 1985, the OPEC cartel may be in no
worse shape than it is now, but this writer is not inclined to make
any bets on any particular scenario, even his own. The world oil
project at M.I.T. is working out a simulation model where many
variant assumptions can be tried, but that is another story, which will
not be dealt with here.

